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might just as well be philosophical and sigh, "Logic and taxa-
tion are not always the best of friends.""
"'From the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice McReynolds in Sonneborn Brothers
v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506.
FROM THE FLOOR OF HELL TO THE CEILING OF
HEAVEN
By HELEN THORP, School of Law, 1939, Denver University
HE law, it is said, is in a constant state of flux. In no
field is this statement more apposite than in the field per-
taining to aeronautics. The development of aircraft law
presents one of the best examples of the adaptation (and, ac-
cording to some authorities, the overthrow) of ancient and
well settled legal principles to present-day needs.
The root of the trouble as far as aviation law is con-
cerned arose in the early part of the fourteenth century when
(as has been asserted)' Cina da Pistoia offered his celebrated
maxim, "cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum." In forming
his rule of law, Signor da Pistoia gave little thought to Icarus'
abortive attempt to conquer the air, and the courts in the fif-
teenth and sixteenth centuries were totally unconcerned with
the designs for flying machines then-being drawn by Cesare
Borgia's protege, Leonardo da Vinci. The maxim sounds so
neat, so all-inclusive. The courts through the centuries hap-
pily announced it and embedded it in the law.The advent of the airplane as a practical thing presented
no small problem. Its importance in modern commercial and
economical life was not underestimated by the courts. But
freedom of flight across the country could not be reconciled
with the old maxim.
Several theories were advanced by the courts and the
writers to solve the dilemma. In general they were the theories
of privilege, of zones of use-as of expected use-and of nui-
sance. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss or analyze
these theories in any great detail.
The nuisance theory has its basis in the idea that there is
176 Penna Law Review 631.
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no trespass unless to physical land, but the owner of the land
may have redress when the flight of aircraft over his property
constitutes a nuisance,
In preference to that theory some courts of the United
States have followed the theory of zone of expected use. Here
the courts say that the owner of the soil owns so much of the
column of air above as he may reasonably expect to use, but
above that point the air may be used by anyone unless and
until his acts constitute a nuisance.
Neither of the above-mentioned theories has received as
much support in this country as has the privilege theory. This
is the position taken by the American Law Institute in its Re-
statement of the Law of Torts. Here the old maxim is recog-
nized as to ownership of airspace above the land, and every
unauthorized entry thereon is held to be a trespass, but such
trespass is privileged until actual damage is suffered by the
landowner or until the trespass becomes a nuisance.4 This has
also been called the easement theory5 on the ground that the
public acquires an easement in the airspace.
The theory has been criticized and recent decisions seem
to indicate that those criticisms have not been unfounded. In
1935, Leon Green felt that the question should not be said to
be one of privilege, but rather of right;' that the restatement
theory tel quel put the whole burden on the aviator when a
better result would be reached by a more equal balancing of the
burden between such aviator and the landowner below. This
eminent writer casts out the old maxim as entirely unsatisfac-
tory today.
And in the leading case of Hinman v. Pacific Air Trans-
port, decided in 1936, the federal court seems to have accom-
plished the same result. The facts of the case were not com-
plicated. Plaintiff owned land adjacent to an airport and
alleged numerous and repeated fights over his land ranging in
height from five to one hundred and seventy-five feet above the
surface. But he showed no actual damage. The court held
that flying above the surface of land is not a trespass, but is
'Salmond on Torts (7th Edition, p. 238).
'Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp. (1932), 55 Fed. 2nd 201.
fTorts Restatement, Secs. 158, 159, 194.
'35 Michigan Law Review 1123.
'Journal of Air Law 6: 201-205.
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lawful unless it results in injury to the owner in the use of his
land. The result here is the same as that reached by applica-
tion of the restatement theory, but the method is, of course,
far more direct. The court slashed through the red tape of old
rules and new theories and laid down its rule of law. Its doing
soT was approved by Mr. Green in an article in the Illinois Law
Review.' It is to be noted that with this case the burden is
taken from the aviator and thrown entirely on the landowner.
He may have no recovery until he can prove actual damage.
The court didn't stop here, however, but went on to hold
that airspace is not the subject of ownership except as the
owner of the surface below may so subject it as an incident of
his use of the surface, and until that time it is open to naviga-
tion by aircraft. This is not a tendency to the zone of expected
use theory, for here is no allowance of air to the landowner for
what he may reasonably expect to use, but rather a flat denial
as to him until he actually uses that amount of air above him,
or uses it as an incident to his use below. Actual use instead
of a reasonable expectancy is the test here.
The case presents a federal court in contradiction with
the restatement theory, which court is evolving rules for avi-
ation alone. The last word, of course, is for the Supreme
Court and until it has spoken all roads are open.
The Hinman case pales, however, when one considers the
case of Tucker v. United Air Lines and City of Iowa City 9
from the District Court of Iowa in 1 935. Here a suit by the
city against Tucker and a suit by Tucker against the airline
were consolidated for a single determination. Tucker owned
land adjacent to the airport and sought to enjoin the company
from flying planes at such low altitude as to interfere with the
reasonable enjoyment of his property and with trees he had
planted along his boundary line. The court enjoined the com-
pany from flying at an altitude lower than thirty feet. But it
also enjoined Tucker from planting trees higher than twenty-
five feet on his boundary line as being an improper and unnec-
essary use of his property.
This holding leaves one aghast. To follow it to its logi-
cal conclusion would mean that a landowner may use his prop-
'84 Fed. 2nd 755, Review 499 (1937).831 Illinois Law Review 499 (1937).
*Supp. 1935 U. S. Aviation Reports 1.
DICTA 127
DICTA
erty only in such a way as not to interfere with the flight of
aircraft above. If he builds a house one inch in from his
boundary line he may be enjoined from building a two-story
house and commanded to build only a one-story house. If he
desires to improve his land he may not have a tree higher than
twenty-five feet, an absurdly small tree. And this is an "im-
proper and unnecessary use of property"! The positions are
reversed. The landowner has the privilege and the aviator the
right-the right not to be interfered with in his flight.
Here is a taking of property without due process; here is
a taking of private property for private use without compen-
sation; here is an impairment of vested rights; here is a denial
of equal protection of the laws; here, finally, is a contradiction
of the very spirit of the federal Constitution.
The holding is not one of a court of last resort, and that
seems to be its only saving grace. The case has been com-
mented upon very briefly in Columbia Law Review but not
elsewhere to the writer's knowledge.
The tendency then seems to be away from the privilege
theory to a theory of right. And Colorado seems in line with
this tendency.
In 193 7, Colorado passed its first important Aeronautics
Act. Previous statutes had dealt principally with the creation
of a commission, its duties and powers. 1 The recent act re-
pealed these statutes for the most part, 2 and set up new ma-
chinery for the handling of the problem. It also made certain
pronouncements interesting in the present discussion. The
act was entitled:
"AN ACT
providing for the regulation of aeronautics within this state; providing
for uniformity with the federal laws regulating aeronautics creating a
state aeronautic commission; providing the powers and. duties of such
commission; providing for promulgation and issuance of rules and regu-
lations by such commission."
It went on to provide that the sovereignty in space above
the la-nds and waters of the state rested in the state, except
"36 Columbia Law Review 483-484; facts and decree also reported, 6 Journal Air
Law: correction on fact, 7 Journal Air Law, 293, 622."35 C. S. A. Chap. 17.
"'37 Session Laws, Chap. 81, Sec. 14.
128
DICTA ' 129
where assumed by United States law.1" It then provided that
"'Ownership of space above lands and waters of this state is de-
clared to be vested in the several'owners of the surface beneath, subject
to the right of fight described in Section 8 hereof.'
14
"Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this state is lawful,
unless at such low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to
which the land or water is put by the owner, or unless so conducted as to
*be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or
water, or in violation of the air commerce regulations which have been,
or may hereafter be, promulgated by the Department of Commerce of
the United States. The landing of an aircraft on the lands or waters of
another, without his consent, is unlawful, except in case of forced land-
ing. For damages caused by a forced landing, however, the owner or
lessee of the aircraft or the airman 'shall be liable for actual damage
caused by such forced landing.""
These sections are similar to Sections 2, 3, 4 and 11 of
the Uniform Aeronautics Act adopted in twenty-one states
and Hawaii.
Colorado then concedes the ownership of the airspace
above the land to be in the owner of the land. But such own-
ership is subject to a "right of flight." The privilege theory
is discarded and the theory of a right is enunciated. Such flight
is not a privileged trespass, but is lawful. Here, as in the Hin-
man case, is a denial of the red tape of the restatement. Such
flight is lawful unless at such low altitude as to interfere with
the then existing use to which the land or water is put by the
owner. The words "then existing use" are important-for
here is a rejection of the zone of expected use theory and the
test is that of actual use. Again the statute enacts the holding
of the Hinman case.
The statute goes on, "or unless so conducted as to be im-
minently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the
land or water"--and this, fortunately, would seem to be in
contradiction to the holding in the Tucker case, for trees
would certainly be lawfully on the land.
It provides for damages in case of a forced landing only
when actual damage is done, and would seem to put the
burden on the landowner to show such damage.
The Colorado statute is a progressive one and seems to
enact those rules most highly favored by the courts at the pres-
ent day. It does something more than mere lip service to the




old maxim in that it seems to provide that when the land-
owner actually puts the airspace above him to use, he is the
actual and undisputed owner of that amount of space. Thus
it would seem that, if the zoning laws did not interfere, a land-
owner could for purposes erect an Eiffel Tower or an Empire
State Building on his land without infringement on the air-
craft's right of flight, which is conditioned on the nonuser of
the airspace by the landowner.
The statute has not yet been construed by the Colorado
court. It is to be noted that the Colorado statute, as well as
statutes in other states, leaves the actual regulation of aeronau-
tics to federal authorities, and it is perhaps possible that the
whole field will one day be subject to federal authority alone.
This is the solution proposed by writers who disclaim all of
the theories mentioned above and would hold the airspace to
be a channel of commerce, analogous to navigable waters. The
public would then have a natural easement in the airspace and
if anyone would suffer it would be the landowner.
Signor da Pistoia's maxim, then, has not been cast off in
its entirety. Something of its spirit remains in modern law.
But it has been remodeled, as have the ancient palazzos of his
own Italy, to conform to modern needs-with electric lights
and a landing field.
JUST A HACKNEYED EXPRESSION
On May 31, 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, speaking at
Washington of the action of the United States Supreme Court in holding
N. R. A. unconstitutional, publicly declared that we were no longer
living in the "horse and buggy days." This striking way of stating a
great truth thereafter achieved great popularity, partly because it was
felt to be of most recent origin.
Patient research, however, has brought to light the fact that it was
eight years earlier and in Colorado that this cogent phrase and the idea
which it expressed were in our times first put to official use. On April
18, 1927, our own Judge John T. Adams, then one of the members
of the Colorado Supreme Court, said, in the case of Colby v. Board, 81
Colo. 344, 353: "Even so we do not apprehend that we are now offend-
ing the rule of stare decisis as applied to any of our previous decisions.
We are only applying old principles to new conditions or to the changed
facts of modern life. Thus, a horse and buggy day decision in the livery
stable case, Phillips v. City of Denver, 19 Colo. 179, intimately allied
with those times, would be incongruous now if not considered in the
light of modern industrial and civic development."
BENTLEY M. MCMULLIN, of the Denuer Bar.
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